

The Gospel according to Wittgenstein

John Hyman

1. Wittgenstein's early philosophy was worked out in the six years or so following his arrival in Cambridge in 1911, and published in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1922. After a long hiatus, Wittgenstein took up philosophy again in 1929, and soon began to develop the ideas which were published after his death—first in the *Philosophical Investigations*, the masterpiece of his mature philosophy, and then in editions of various notebooks, drafts and collections of philosophical remarks. Both of these philosophies include highly original and influential views about the nature of religion. I shall discuss them in turn.

2. Wittgenstein said that the fundamental idea of the *Tractatus* is 'that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the *logic* of facts' (TLP, 4.0312).

Perhaps a simpler way of expressing this thought is to say that the *propositions* of logic are not descriptions. Frege had thought that the propositions of logic describe timeless relations between abstract objects; Russell had thought that they describe the most general features of the world. We arrive at the propositions of logic, according to Russell, by abstracting from the content of empirical propositions, and so the propositions of logic themselves describe the world we encounter in experience, but they do so in the most abstract and general terms.

Wittgenstein argued that Frege and Russell underestimated the difference between the propositions of logic and empirical propositions, because they agreed in thinking, or assuming, that however different these kinds of propositions may be, however different the kinds of things they say *are*, they still have this much in common, that they say *something*. Wittgenstein's own view was that the propositions of logic say nothing; they contain no information whatsoever;

they are simply *tautologies*: ‘For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.’ ‘... all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing’ (TLP 4.461, 5.43).

If logical propositions say nothing, what is it for a proposition to say *something*? The answer Wittgenstein gave in the *Tractatus* is one he later summarized as follows: ‘The individual words of language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.’ (PI, §1) Accordingly, the sense of a sentence will depend on the meanings of the words which are combined in it, and the *way in which* they are combined. Just as the objects to which the individual words correspond can be combined or arranged in different ways, so can the words in a sentence; and the sense of the sentence will depend on what arrangement of objects it presents to us. Hence, if a proposition says anything at all, it says that such-and-such objects are arranged in such-and-such a way. The only thing we can do with words is to describe, or misdescribe, the facts.

Thus, according to the *Tractatus*, ‘One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group – like a *tableau vivant* – presents a state of affairs’ (TLP, 4.0311). This is known as the *picture theory of meaning*. Words are combined in sentences to form a *picture* or *model* of a possible state of affairs in the world. If the way that things are arranged corresponds to the way the words are combined, then the sentence is true; and if not, then it is false.

In his own preface to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein said that ‘the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence’ (TLP, p.3). So far, I have commented on ‘what can be said’, as Wittgenstein himself did, in the larger part of the *Tractatus*. But by doing so, I have broken the very rules which fix the limits of what can be said. For as soon as I try to

explain how a sentence must be related to the state of affairs it represents, I try to do more with words than merely describe the facts (TLP, 4.12).

This implication of Wittgenstein's doctrine, that philosophical propositions are themselves nonsensical, did not escape him. He states it explicitly at the end of the *Tractatus*:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said ... and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions ... // My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP, 6.53)

But it is not just philosophy that lies beyond the reach of language. Ethics, aesthetics, and whatever thoughts we might aspire to have about the meaning of life, or about God, all belong to what Wittgenstein calls 'the mystical'; and they are alike incapable of being put into words. Nothing which touches on matters of value can be captured in words. Every human effort to address or even to articulate what Wittgenstein called 'the problems of life' must be in vain: 'When the answer cannot be put into words,' he said, 'neither can the question be put into words' (TLP, 6.5).

If we accept Wittgenstein's austere conception of language, and its consequence that the ethical, aesthetic and religious aspects of human life – which he calls 'the mystical' – cannot be put into words, we may feel tempted to conclude that the importance we attach to aesthetic experience, to ethics and to religion is the result of an illusion. Alternatively, we may conclude that what can be put into words is paltry by comparison with what cannot. There is no doubt that

Wittgenstein intends us to draw the latter conclusion. In fact, in a letter written in 1919 to a prospective publisher, Wittgenstein says that the *Tractatus* ‘consists of two parts: of that which is under consideration here and of all that I have *not* written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one.’¹ This cannot have been an encouragement to a prospective publisher; but it is a telling remark.

Still, it is difficult to know what place, if any, God and faith have in the system of the *Tractatus*. God is mentioned four times, but only the last of these comments has anything to do with religion. It is this:

How things are *in* the world is of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. (TLP, 6.432)

The emphasis on the word ‘in’ is Wittgenstein’s; and perhaps its significance is explained in the next remark but one: ‘It is not *how things are in the world* that is mystical, but *that it exists*’ (TLP, 6.44). Thus, Wittgenstein may have wanted to intimate that God reveals himself in the fact that the world exists, the fact that ‘there is what there is’ (NB, p.86)—though we must not forget that this is not strictly speaking a fact at all, and is therefore impossible to state.

We should not imagine that this is meant to be an argument for God’s existence. It would be a strange argument indeed, if this had been what Wittgenstein intended—one with a nonsensical premise and a nonsensical conclusion. What may be intended, however, is that a religious attitude is an attitude towards the world *as a whole*, an attitude in which it isn’t *how things happen to be in the world* that absorbs our attention, but *that it exists*. And a religious attitude can also be described as, in some sense, an acknowledgement of God, although of course it is an attitude which we must never attempt to articulate by *saying* that God exists: ‘What we

1. *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives*, ed. C.G. Luckhardt (Hassocks: Harvester, 1979), p.94.

cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' (TLP, 7).

This is what the *Tractatus* hints at; but a few remarks in Wittgenstein's notebooks, which he wrote in July 1916, when the Austrian army in which he was serving was retreating across the Carpathian mountains and his life was in constant danger, are more explicit. They identify God with 'the meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world', with fate and with the world itself (NB, p.73f.). However, the impression they convey most forcibly is that faith consists in the ability to see that life has a meaning; that this in turn consists in living in such a way 'that life stops being problematic', for 'the solution to the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this problem' (NB, p.74; cf. TLP, 6.521); and that living thus will enable one to achieve a sort of happiness—something perhaps akin to a Stoic calm—by detaching oneself from the uncontrollable contingencies of the world, and accepting it without fear. Wittgenstein incorporated some of these remarks into the *Tractatus*; and it seems that the rest continued to exert an influence on his thought, and remain, albeit with an altered emphasis, in the background of the *Tractatus*.

The *Tractatus* presents an austere view of human language, even a repressive one, for it denies the intelligibility of much of what we say, including everything which mattered most to Wittgenstein himself. This doctrine was developed as the result of a brilliant, profound and subversive critique of Frege's and Russell's philosophy of logic. But the doctrine that religious truths are ineffable has an important place in the history of religious thought, and it is likely to appear plausible if one thinks that language cannot capture our profoundest feelings.

Wittgenstein's upbringing led him to revere musical creativity, and it is possible that his love of music made him receptive to this thought. At any rate, the achievement of his early philosophy, so far as the philosophy of religion is concerned, was to have formulated the doctrine that religious truths are ineffable, in terms which are clear and explicit precisely because they are

founded on a theory of language.

3. In the thirties, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language was dramatically transformed, and his earlier view of religion could not survive the transformation. He abandoned the doctrines that a proposition is a logical picture compounded out of names whose meanings are the things they stand for, and that the intelligible use of language always serves a single purpose—to describe the facts. He came to believe – on the contrary – that the meaning of a word is its use in the language; that words can be used for an indefinitely broad and heterogeneous range of purposes; and hence that the task of philosophy is not logical, but hermeneutical. Philosophy, he now contends, does not consist in logical analysis, but in the description of our various 'language-games'.

The term 'language-game' has excited controversy and caused some puzzlement; but a language-game is simply a human activity involving speech or writing, in which a distinctive range of concepts is employed. The word 'game' is there to remind us of three things: first, that these activities are guided and constrained by the rules we enunciate when we explain the meanings of words; second, that they are extremely varied and are not usefully seen as elaborations of a single theme, such as communicating information or producing beliefs; and third, that they take place and have significance only in the context of human forms of life and culture.

So, when the later Wittgenstein writes about religious belief, he continues to argue that the use of language to express religious beliefs is quite unlike the use of language to state facts; but he no longer infers that it must therefore be a *misuse* of language. His principal aims are to explain how concepts such as sin, redemption, judgement, grace and atonement can have an indispensable place in an individual's or a community's way of life, and to show how we can

resist assimilating the use of these concepts to hypotheses, predictions and theoretical explanations.

For example, he talks at length about the belief that there will be a last judgement. His stated intention is to show that ‘in religious discourse we use such expressions as: “I believe that so and so will happen,” ... differently to the way in which we use them in science’ (LC, p.57). But he argues in favour of a far more surprising and radical doctrine, namely that believing in a last judgement does not mean thinking it certain or probable that a certain kind of event will occur sometime in the future. This does not merely distance the use of an expression like ‘I believe that so and so will happen’ in religious discourse from its use in science; it distinguishes it from any kind of prediction at all.

So, if the expression ‘I believe that there will be a last judgement’ is not used to make a prediction, how is it used? This is Wittgenstein’s answer:

Here believing obviously plays much more this role: suppose we said that a certain picture might play the role of constantly admonishing me, or I always think of it. Here there would be an enormous difference between those people for whom the picture is constantly in the foreground, and others who just didn’t use it at all. (LC, p.56)

This example is not atypical. Wittgenstein equates having religious beliefs with using religious concepts and having the attitudes and emotions that their use implies. He says this most explicitly as follows: ‘It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference’ (CV, p.64). And he says this about coming to believe in God:

Life can educate one to a belief in God. And *experiences* too are what bring this about; but I don’t mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show

us ‘the existence of this being’, but, e.g., sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense-impression shows us an object, nor do they give rise to *conjectures* about him. Experiences, thoughts,—life can force this concept on us. (CV, p.86)

Now, it was one of the fundamental themes of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that the concepts we use cannot be justified by reference to reality. Some philosophers have argued that our concepts, or at any rate the concepts of science, are correct, that they conform to the nature of the things we use them to describe. For example, our language prevents us from saying that colours have a pitch or that musical notes are coloured because red *cannot* be a semitone higher than blue and a musical note *cannot* be visibly orange. Wittgenstein argues, to the contrary, that our network of concepts, which he calls *grammar*, cannot either conflict or accord with the facts. For what we say conflicts with the facts if it is false and accords with the facts if it is true. And although the concepts we use may be well- or ill-suited to the business of stating particular sorts of truths, the truths and falsehoods that we state are not themselves concepts, any more than the sentences we utter are predicates. Grammar itself is therefore *arbitrary*, i.e. not accountable to any reality. (This does not mean unimportant, capricious or readily alterable.) A system of measurement, for example, is not correct or incorrect in the way that a statement of length is; although of course some systems are more useful, convenient and easy to understand and apply than others. (This doctrine is, in fact, a constant feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, early and late. The first entry in his *Notebooks* is: ‘Logic must take care of itself’ (NB, p.1).)

So, Wittgenstein held that ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference’ – that is, a passionate commitment to the use of certain concepts. And he also held that a ‘system of reference’ cannot be verified or justified by comparing it with the facts. For example, the metric system cannot be verified or falsified,

although of course my belief that the earth moves at 30 metres per second can. But if a religious belief is something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference - as opposed to a passionate commitment to the truth of an empirical proposition - then a religious belief cannot be *true* or *false*. And Wittgenstein held that religious beliefs cannot be *reasonable* or *unreasonable* either, if that means that they can or cannot be justified:

I would say, they are certainly not reasonable, that's obvious. 'Unreasonable' implies, with everyone, rebuke. I want to say: they don't treat this as a matter of reasonability. Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that it is not reasonable, but that it is folly. Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to be. (LC, p.58)

The people Wittgenstein regards as *unreasonable* are apologists for, or against, religion who make the assumption – Wittgenstein calls it 'ludicrous' (LC, p.58) – that religious beliefs can be corroborated or falsified by evidence. But unless religion is confused in this way with something quite different, it is not *unreasonable*. 'Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgement?', Wittgenstein asks rhetorically (LC, p.58). A passionate commitment to a system of reference, as Jacques Bouveresse put it, 'bears a closer resemblance to an affair of the heart than to a rational matter'.² This should not be interpreted as meaning that faith is something which people tend to be irrational about; but rather, that it is something which reason has no bearing on. And this immunity from rational criticism extends even to Christian beliefs about Jesus:

The historical accounts in the Gospels might, historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose nothing by this ... because historical

2. J. Bouveresse, *Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.19.

proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to belief. (CV, p.32)

In sum, Wittgenstein defends two principal doctrines: first, a doctrine about the meaning of religious discourse, and second, a doctrine about the epistemology of religious beliefs. The first doctrine is that the expression of a religious belief in words is not a prediction or a hypothesis, but instead expresses ‘something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference’. And the second is that religious beliefs are therefore immune from falsification and from verification. Compare a superstition, for example, that an amulet will protect the person who wears it from disease. This *is* a hypothesis, which adequate statistical data will verify or falsify. Critics and apologists who mistake religious beliefs for hypotheses and muster evidence in their favour or against them confuse religious faith and superstition, Wittgenstein says (CV, p.72).

4. Is Wittgenstein’s account of religious belief convincing? I doubt it. First, is he right to argue that a religious belief is ‘something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference’? Surely not. Admittedly, believing that God exists is very unlike believing a hypothesis in history or in science. And the differences have to do with the ways in which we may be led to believe that God exists, and the ways in which this belief will influence our other beliefs and our feelings, commitments and actions. But it does not follow that believing that God exists is *nothing but* ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference’—i.e. a commitment to leading a life in which questions will be asked, obligations will be acknowledged, decisions taken and actions performed, which can only be explained or understood by the use of religious concepts. And surely, if I have and retain that commitment, my belief that God exists will typically be among my *reasons* for doing so.

Perhaps one can defend Wittgenstein on this point. In his *Remarks on Frazer’s Golden*

Bough, Wittgenstein comments on the extraordinary custom of killing the priest-king in his prime, so that his soul will be kept fresh: ‘Where that practice and these views go together,’ Wittgenstein says, ‘the practice does not spring from the view, but they are both just there.’ (PO, p.119) But even if this is often true, it does not follow that the ‘view’ *is* the commitment to the ‘practice’. No doubt the expression of a religious belief can often convey a passionate commitment to a way of life - one which involves a variety of customs, habits, rituals (in short, practices) in which a range of religious concepts, amounting even to a ‘system of reference’, are essentially involved. But we should not infer that the passionate commitment is all that the belief signifies, any more than we should infer from the fact that a moral judgement may convey passionate admiration or intense disgust that this is all *it* signifies. This reductive view of moral judgements seemed appealing to some during the heyday of verificationism; but it does not carry conviction.

Is his account of the difference between the proposition that God exists and existential propositions in science and history convincing? Again, surely not. He is right, I think, to insist that there are many different kinds of existential proposition. Belief in God’s existence is *not* the same sort of existential belief as the belief that there are infinitely many primes, or the belief that there is a planet more distant than Uranus. But one good way of seeing the various differences between these various propositions is to consider the different ways in which they are proved or supported. For example, the existence of infinitely many primes is a necessary truth, which can be proved by a reductio of its contradictory; and the existence of a planet more distant than Uranus is a contingent truth, which was initially postulated to explain the orbit of Uranus, and subsequently confirmed by observation.

Furthermore, since evidence and argument are not the exclusive property of science, Wittgenstein cannot be right to insist that if we try to prove or support the proposition that God

exists we are already trapped in confusion, because we are treating religion as if it were science. It would, I think, be foolish to maintain that Anselm and Aquinas were peddling superstitions (cf. LC, p.59), or that apostasy cannot be based on reasons. And it is surely a mistake to claim, as Wittgenstein does, that when we consider God's existence, 'what is here at issue is not the existence of something [*dass es sich hier um eine Existenz nicht handelt*]'.³ (CV, p.82.) Kierkegaard may have had something similar in mind when he wrote: 'God does not exist; he is eternal.' But the differences between 'God exists' and existential propositions in science or history does nothing to support this idea; and neither does the doctrine that God cannot begin to exist or cease to exist. If Democritus believed that atoms cannot begin or cease to exist, it does not follow that he did not believe that an atom is *eine Existenz*—an entity, or something which exists.

Is Wittgenstein right to insulate religious beliefs from 'the historical proof-game'? I doubt it. It is certainly impossible to insulate religion entirely from rational criticism: 'If Christ be not risen, our faith is vain' implies 'Either Christ is risen or our faith is vain' for exactly the same reason as 'If the weather is not fine, our picnic is ruined' implies 'Either the weather is fine or our picnic is ruined'. But if religious beliefs and systems of religious beliefs are not invulnerable to logic, why should they be cocooned from other sorts of rational scrutiny?

Finally, is Wittgenstein right to insist that religious faith is not so much a matter of assenting to a series of doctrines as cleaving to a form of life? I think he is. But nothing in his later philosophy of language, and in particular no part of his doctrine about the relation between language and forms of life, implies that a form of life cannot involve historical or metaphysical beliefs (such as that Jesus rose from the dead or that the soul is immortal) as well as concepts and

3. I have followed Winch's translation; but 'what is here at issue is not an entity' may be preferable.

attitudes: all of them – beliefs, concepts and attitudes – in a mutually supporting relation. Nor does it imply that the beliefs which form part of the core of a form of life cannot include false or incoherent ones.

Christians have traditionally believed a number of well-defined historical propositions and rather ill-defined metaphysical ones, which Christian philosophers have sought to formulate precisely. This is not to say that these formulations – such as Aquinas’s teaching on the soul or the Eucharist – tell us *exactly* what Christians have traditionally believed: on the contrary, a precise formulation cannot exactly capture something imprecise, precisely because of its precision. However, it can help us to settle whether the ill-defined belief is paradoxical or implicitly contradictory. How can it do this? Wittgenstein himself suggests a plausible answer to this question in the *Philosophical Grammar*:

But if we wish to draw boundaries in the use of a word, in order to clear up philosophical paradoxes, then alongside the actual picture of the use (in which as it were the different colours flow into one another without sharp boundaries) we may put another picture which is in certain ways like the first but is built up of colours with clear boundaries between them. (PG, p.76)

Wittgenstein does not maintain explicitly that religious beliefs, unlike the formulations of them offered by philosophers, cannot be paradoxical. But several of his remarks point in this direction;⁴ and some of his followers have not been afraid to claim this directly. For example, D.Z. Phillips writes as follows:

If the notion of an inner substance called ‘the soul’ is the philosophical chimera we have suggested it is, whatever is meant by the immortality of the soul cannot

4. See, for example, CV, pp.22, 32, 73, 85; but cf. CV, p.1.

be the continued existence of such a substance.⁵

Whether or not Wittgenstein would have agreed with this inference, it is surely quite unconvincing, because there is no reason why it should be impossible to espouse, seriously and sincerely, doctrines which are demonstrably incoherent. In fact, since every philosopher has managed it at one time or another, and since not every philosopher is dishonest or insincere, it *must* be possible. The trick, presumably, is to avoid explicit contradictions; but whilst it may sometimes take a philosopher's ingenuity to do this, when challenged or cross-examined, a like-minded community with a reassuring intellectual elite seems likely to make it as easy as falling off a log, even for the man Wittgenstein calls 'an honest religious thinker'. (CV, p.73) If the immortality of the soul *is* a contradictory doctrine, it does not follow that one cannot believe in it.

One important source of support for incoherent beliefs is the use of figurative language. It is a familiar fact that analogies can explain; but sometimes the explanations are bogus. There is a nice example which crops up from time to time in the philosophical literature: an explanation of wireless. It begins with an explanation of wire. Wire is like a dog that is so long that when you pull its tail in Boston it barks in New York. And now for wireless. Wireless is just the same, but without the dog. Figurative language, like analogies, has its authentic and its bogus uses; and its principal bogus use is to make us imagine that we understand something. That is why Aristotle, who argued famously that metaphor is the main part of excellence in diction, also insisted, in the *Posterior Analytics*, that one should never attempt to define by means of metaphor.⁶

5. D.Z. Phillips, 'Dislocating the Soul', in *Can Religion be Explained Away?*, ed. D.Z. Phillips (London: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.237.

6. *Poetics* 1459a5; *Posterior Analytics* 97b37f.

Are history and philosophy therefore capable of demonstrating that traditional Christianity is worthless, or that ‘people do all of this out of sheer stupidity’? (GB, p.1) Not at all; for if the gospels are demonstrably false and no coherent formulation of the central Christian doctrines is possible, it does not follow that Christianity is either stupid or worthless. The Stoic doctrine of preferred indifferents may be incoherent; the doctrine that forms are material certainly is. But it would be a gross mistake to infer that Stoicism was a stupid or worthless system. Incoherence is a defect in a system of religious beliefs, because if one can *see* that a doctrine is incoherent, that is a compelling reason to disbelieve it.⁷ But philosophers, who have a professional interest in coherence and consistency, are prone to exaggerate their importance.

5. Wittgenstein’s influence in the philosophy of religion is due to scattered remarks, marginalia and students’ notes. He never intended to publish any material on the subject, and never wrote about it systematically. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean a moderately clear picture of his views about the nature and justification of religious belief.

His semantic doctrine is an ingenious application of a powerful strategy, which consists in making ‘a radical break with the idea [which lay at the heart of the *Tractatus*] that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts -- which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please’ (PI, §304). This strategy produced radical and fruitful ideas in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. Its application in the philosophy of religion has a kinship with both, but is less successful than either.

7. There is a strand in Christian philosophy which denies this. Indeed, Tertullian sometimes held that the absurdity of a doctrine is a *reason* for believing it. See J.N.D. Kelly *Early Christian Doctrines*, fifth edition (London: A. & C. Black, 1977), p.152.

The epistemological corollary, that religious beliefs are immune from rational criticism and incapable of receiving rational support, has the interesting consequence that, as Wittgenstein said, ‘if Christianity is the truth then all the philosophy that is written about it is false’ (CV, p.83), but it has little else to recommend it. Wittgenstein once described his work as ‘one of the heirs of what used to be called philosophy’ (BB, 28); and it may be possible to regard a ‘passionate commitment to a system of reference’ not as religious belief – certainly not Christian religious belief – but as one of the heirs of what used to be called Christian religious belief. Whether it could enjoy as vigorous a life as its ancestor is a sociological and perhaps a psychological question, which I shall not address.

Abbreviations

CV: *Culture and Value*, ed. G.H. von Wright, tr. P. Winch (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).

LC: *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. C. Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

NB: *Notebooks 1914-16*, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961).

PG: *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A.J.P. Kenny (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974).

PI: *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, second edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

PO: *Philosophical Occasions 1912-51*, ed. J.C. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

TLP: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).