SECOND PUBLIC EXAMINATION
in the Honour Schools including Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

TRINITY TERM 2019

Tuesday 28 May 2019, 2.30pm – 5.30pm

This paper contains nineteen questions.

Answer THREE questions.

Do not turn over the page until told that you may do so.
1. If we were to appeal to the principle of parsimony when faced with the mind-body problem, what kind of view would emerge as the most plausible?

2. Is there anything wrong with folk psychology?

3. ‘The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. They are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted to the ground, profoundly interested in the local weather. They have sensations, thoughts, emotions, beliefs, desires. But they are constitutionally incapable of any sort of behaviour. They lack the necessary physiology. They are not even disposed to behave in any way.’ (GALEN STRAWSON)

Strawson argues that such creatures are possible. Is he right?

4. EITHER

(a) Can two organisms be exactly alike with respect to their functional states but different with respect to some of their phenomenal states?

OR

(b) If it could be the case that I have an exact physical duplicate who lacks phenomenal consciousness, does it follow that I lack phenomenal consciousness too?

5. ‘To believe in the phenomenal aspect of the world, but deny that it is epiphenomenal, is to bet against the truth of physics.’ (DAVID LEWIS) Is this correct?

6. EITHER

(a) Can one resist externalism about mental content despite the Twin Earth thought experiments?

OR

(b) Can externalism about mental content account for beliefs about non-existent entities?

7. ‘Any plausible theory of intentionality should account for the possibility that groups of individuals can have intentional states over and above the intentional states of individual members of such groups.’ Do you agree?

8. If human pain is identifiable with one type of physical state, octopus pain is identifiable with another type of physical state, Martian pain is identifiable with yet another type of physical state (and so on and so forth), would that mean that the type-identity theory is true?

9. ‘The mere claim of mind-body supervenience leaves unaddressed the question what grounds or accounts for it.’ (JAEGWON KIM) If this is true, what should physicalists do?
10. Does bodily motion require action? Does action require bodily motion?

11. Is giving reasons for an action the same thing as causally explaining it?

12. What does it mean to say that there are no psycho-physical laws? Why might one think there are no such laws?

13. In what ways, if any, does the knowledge of your own mind depend on your knowledge of the external world?

14. ‘Emotions are intentional states, but are not propositional attitudes; therefore, there are intentional states which are not propositional attitudes.’ Should we accept this argument?

15. How does imagination differ from perception?

16. If two visual experiences are indistinguishable from a subject’s perspective, must these experiences have an underlying mental state in common?

17. If phantom pains are possible, does it follow that pains do not have locations?

18. To what extent can problems in conceptualising self-deception be answered by reflection on different kinds of consciousness?

19. What is a mental state?